The network structure of mutual support links: Evidence from rural Tanzania by Comola, Margherita
The network structure of mutual support links:
Evidence from rural Tanzania
Margherita Comola
To cite this version:
Margherita Comola. The network structure of mutual support links: Evidence from rural
Tanzania. PSE Working Papers n2008-74. 2010. <halshs-00585968>
HAL Id: halshs-00585968
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00585968
Submitted on 14 Apr 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2008 - 74 
 
 
 
The network structure of mutual support links: 
 
Evidence from rural Tanzania 
 
 
 
 
Margherita Comola 
 
 
 
 
 JEL Codes: C52, D85, O12 
 Keywords: Mutual support, network formation, structural 
estimation, indirect contacts  
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
LABORATOIRE D’ECONOMIE APPLIQUÉE - INRA 
 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
The Network Structure of Mutual Support Links:
Evidence from Rural Tanzania ∗
Margherita Comola †
June 2010
[Previous versions have circulated with the title:
“The Network Structure of Informal Arrangements: Evidence from Rural Tanzania”]
Abstract
This paper takes a network perspective to investigate how rural households in devel-
oping countries form the links through which they provide and get economic support. I
test the hypothesis that indirect contacts (e.g. friends of friends) matter for link forma-
tion. An estimation procedure of a network formation model a` la Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) is proposed and applied to data on a single village in Tanzania. Results show that
when agents evaluate the net advantage of forming a link they also consider the wealth
and the position of indirect contacts. The network externalities from indirect contacts
are negative, which suggests a mechanism of competition over scarce resources. This pa-
per proposes the first structural estimation of an endogenous network formation model,
and also contributes to the development literature by overcoming the dyadic regression
approach and providing evidence that village-level network structure has an explanatory
value disregarded by all previous studies.
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1 Introduction
As social capital theorists have stated for some time (Coleman, 1988; Wilson, 1987) and
economists have realized more recently, a person’s network of contacts constitutes a crucial
resource. This is especially the case for rural communities in developing countries where all
outcomes, from weddings to money lending, are determined by informal, multi-purpose in-
teractions (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Hoddinott, Dercon and Krishnan, 2005). Whenever
economic and financial institutions are weak, people in need are forced to rely on family,
friends and associates; therefore social links assume an economic value. The most common
example are risk-sharing arrangements: when households have no access to credit, either
because there are no institutions that provide it or because households cannot meet the col-
lateral required to enter a formal transaction, private transfers such as loans or gifts are used
to stabilize consumption in face of idiosyncratic shocks as health-related expenses, funerals
and court trials. However several other forms of network-based mutual support such as work
parties, sharecropping and oxen sharing have been documented (Hoddinott, Dercon and Kr-
ishnan, 2005; Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009). In most circumstances people do not form links
specifically for the economic outcome, but the economic arrangements originate from pre-
existing bilateral relationships (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007a).1 This paper focuses on the
bilateral links at the basis of mutual support arrangements, rather than on their outcomes:
I investigate how rural villagers form the links through which they provide and get economic
support, and whether the structure of the community affects link formation. Specifically, I
answer the question of whether agents choose their partners on the basis of their individual
characteristics only, or also for their position with respect to the other agents? That is, do
indirect contacts (e.g. friends of friends) matter?
Villages are the most common economic and social structure throughout the developing
world, accounting for two-thirds of Sub-Saharan African population. For their limited spatial
and informational barriers and their complex social interactions, rural villages are an ideal
setting to study endogenous network formation. I base my analysis on a village called Nyaka-
toke, in the Buboka Rural District of Tanzania, west of Lake Victoria. In the Nyakatoke
Households Survey all adult individuals were asked“Can you give a list of people from inside
or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally rely on for help and/or that can rely on you
for help in cash, kind or labor?”; I use this piece of information to trace the architecture
of the mutual support network, and then propose a structural estimation procedure to test
whether indirect contacts matter.
1The same perspective is adopted in the model by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), where individuals first
form the network of bilateral relations and then use these relations to share income after income shocks are
realized.
2
From the seminal research of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and onwards, economic net-
work theory claims that the entire community graph is relevant for the formation and sever-
ance of links. However, none of the empirical studies on the determinants of link formation
(De Weerdt, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Conley and Udry, 2005; Arcand and Fafchamps, 2008) ac-
knowledges the importance of the community structure. The aim of my paper is to fill this
gap. Borrowing from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), in my framework links are formed at
the discretion of self-interested agents whose utility is given by the overall network structure.
Specifically, link formation is determined by the wealth and the social characteristics of the
potential partner, and I allow externalities from indirect contacts in the dimension of wealth.
I propose an estimation procedure and derive testable predictions on wealth externalities that
I bring to data. Not surprisingly, I find that Nyakatoke villagers are more willing to link with
wealthy partners. More interestingly, I also find that indirect contacts do matter, that is,
that two potential partners with identical characteristics but with different social connections
are not worth the same. Data show that wealth externalities from two-steps-away contacts
are negative: agents prefer wealthy partners who have few/poor additional contacts, which
suggests a competition mechanism. As network theory acknowledges from its very first steps
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), link formation may generate positive or negative externalities:
indirect partners are beneficial if they broaden social interactions, but detrimental if there
is competition for scarce social and/or economic resources. Mutual support arrangements
are an intriguing example that combines positive and negative indirect externalities, and my
results suggest that among Nyakatoke villagers the competition component prevails.
This paper contributes to both network and development economics. First, it proposes an
innovative procedure to estimate endogenous network formation models, showing how partial
observability models (Poirier, 1980) can be used to estimate pairwise stability conditions, and
ultimately bilateral link formation. This approach allows me to overcome the dyadic model,
and to separately model the willingnesses of the two partners to engage in a link. Second,
this paper highlights the importance of indirect contacts to understand link formation. The
only previous empirical study which explicitly recognizes a role for network architecture is the
one by Krishnan and Sciubba (2009). However, while Krishnan and Sciubba test their theo-
retical prediction against data in a reduced form framework, I propose a structural analysis
and recover the parameters of the individual utility function. From a policy point of view,
the major lesson of this paper is that when agents choose their mutual support links they
also look at potential partners’ social connections. As Dasgupta (2003) points out, informal
networks have effects that spill over to all areas of economic activity, so that understanding
the unwritten rules driving informal ties is necessary to design social protection policies at
the micro level.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the relevant literature. In
Section 3 and 4 the data description and the theoretical framework are respectively presented.
Section 5 introduces the estimation procedure, and Section 6 discusses the specifications and
the results. Section 7 concludes summarizing the main findings. Tables and figures are
presented in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
2 Literature Review
The economic literature on mutual support in developing countries is mainly empirical and
focused on risk-sharing arrangements.2 As Mace (1991) has pointed out, the optimal insur-
ance scheme would be full income pooling at the village level, but this is not realized because
of imperfect commitment and information asymmetry among villagers (Ligon, 1998; Coate
and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2000). Fafchamps and Lund (2003) investi-
gate how households deal with shocks in rural Philippines concluding that mutual insurance
takes place in small groups of friends and relatives. De Weerdt (2004) finds that the main
variables predicting mutual support arrangements in Tanzania are kinship, distance, religion
and common friends. Grimard (1997) and Fafchamps (2003) explicitly focus on the impact of
ethnicity. Along similar lines we find the descriptive assessments by Hoddinott, Dercon and
Krishnan (2005), Rosenzweig (1988), Conley and Udry (2005), Dekker (2004) and Goldstein,
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2002). The empirical literature on link formation has mostly used
the dyadic regression model, taking the pair of agents (dyad) as unit of analysis and restrict
the covariates to relational variables, while the procedure I propose allows me to incorporate
individual-specific regressors.
None of the existing contributions explicitly recognize a role for network structure, with
the only exception of Krishnan and Sciubba (2009), who analyze labor exchange arrange-
ments for harvesting and weeding in 15 Ethiopian villages. They modify the coauthor model
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) allowing for heterogeneity among agents: externalities from
indirect contacts are negative because a higher number of partners dilute the effort a farmer
can exert in each partnership. They identify the common features shared by any stable net-
work and then check whether the arrangements observed in data are compatible with the
model’s predictions. My paper departs from a similar setting but, while Krishnan and Sci-
ubba test the theoretical features of stable equilibria, I recover the underlining parameters of
the network formation model.
2Among the theoretical contributions Genicot and Ray (2003) study the effect of allowing subgroup devi-
ation in risk-sharing arrangements and Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008) characterize the properties of stable
insurance schemes for exogenously given network structures.
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My paper builds on the endogenous network formation literature that has flourished in
the last few years (Jackson, 2004; Jackson, 2006). Models of strategic network formation
have originated primarily from two sources: the random graph literature by physicists (Vega-
Redondo, 2007; Guimera’ et al., 2003; Boguna’ et al., 2004) and the economic literature
inspired by game theory. Some economists have approached network formation from a non-
cooperative point of view (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst, 2006).
However, the majority of them have focused on stable networks, where links are formed at
the discretion of self-interested agents whose utility is given by the overall network structure.
Previous studies on applied networks have assessed how the exogenous position of players
in the network impacts the social outcome (Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2009;
Conley and Topa, 2002; Conley and Udry, 2005), while to the best of my knowledge my paper
is the first attempt to structurally estimate endogenous network formation.
3 Nyakatoke Household Survey
The data I use come from the Nyakatoke Household Survey. Nyakatoke is a small village of
the Haya tribe in the Buboka rural district of Tanzania. The community is composed of 600
inhabitants, 307 of which are adults, for a total of 119 households. Inhabitants have been
interviewed in five regular intervals from February to December 2000. First all household
heads, and a few days later, all adults were interviewed; this has produced a rich dataset con-
taining information on households’ demographics, wealth, income sources and income shocks,
transfers and relationships of mutual support. Even if some piece of information was collected
at the individual level, in this paper the 119∗118 = 14042 household dyads are taken as units
of analysis.
Mutual support relationships are crucial for Nyakatoke households, as they self-report
transfers (i.e. zero-interest loans and gifts) to be the main strategy to cope with idiosyn-
cratic shocks like sickness, death, crime and court cases, and ceremonies (Dercon and De
Weerdt, 2006).3 During the first survey round all adult households’ members were asked
“Can you give a list of people from inside or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally
rely on for help and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labour?”; this is the
piece of information I use to define whether a mutual support link exists and to trace the
3In the fifth survey round (December 2000) all adults were asked to enumerate the two worst shocks
experienced in the past 10 years. As Dercon and De Weerdt (2006) report, the respondents listed a total of
296 shocks: illness is the most frequently mentioned shock, followed by death/funeral, ceremony, and crime and
court cases. Community-correlated events (such as bad agricultural prices or weather shocks) are mentioned
only 12 times.
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village architecture. Self-declared link data are open to different interpretations so that the
definition of link necessarily involves some arbitrariness (Comola and Fafchamps, 2009). The
answers to the question above describe the bilateral relationships at the basis of mutual sup-
port arrangements, rather than the actual economic outcomes (i.e. loans and gifts, labour
sharing) which may or may not take place depending on the situation and the specific needs
and income shocks of the partners. In this interpretation, I assume that declared links are
symmetric (i.e. if i is a friend of j then j must be a friend of i) and the link formation
process is bilateral (i.e. both parties involved need to agree for a link to be formed, even if
realized transfers do not necessary flow in both directions). This poses however a problem
for the dyads where i mentions j but j does not mention i: non-reciprocated declarations
must be imputed to some sort of measurement errors, and it would be equally legitimate to
assume under-reporting by j or over-reporting by i. For the way the question is formulated
(somebody they can rely on and/or that can rely on them) and to facilitate the estimates
convergence, I choose under-reporting, and as in De Weerdt (2004) every time a respondent
mentions another one I draw a link between the two households they belong to. With this
procedure 980 links within the 14042 households dyads are identified.4 The resulting network
is dense, with a mean geodesic distance (i.e. number of links in the shortest path between two
partners) of 2.5 steps and a maximum geodesic distance of 5 steps. No household is isolated,
and the number of households’ reported links ranges from 1 to 32. The network exhibits all
the empirical regularities of large social networks (small world properties) that have been
described in the literature.5 For a graphical representation of the Nyakatoke network see
Appendix, Figure 1.A.
Nyakatoke’s village area is small, with an average distance between households of 523
4The estimations in Section 6 have been repeated under the assumption of over-reporting (a link exists only
if both sides declare it). Results are consistent in sign and magnitude but not always in significance, which
is unsurprising given the exiguous number of links (280 instead of 980). This seems to suggest that the few
reciprocated links are simply the better quality ones, that is, the ones where both sides are highly committed.
Also, the very small number of positive outcomes exacerbates the convergence difficulties partial observability
models are well known for.
5These typical features are the following: a) the number of nodes is very large as compared to the average
number of links; b) the network has an unique component or a main component covering a large share of
the population; c) there are more nodes with a really low or a really high number of connections than in a
network where links are formed uniformly at random; d) the number of links of connected partners tends to
be positively correlated; e) the average distance between nodes is small and the maximum distance (diameter)
is in the order of ln(n), (which is precisely our case since ln(119) = 4.77); f) the clustering coefficient, which
measures the tendency of linked nodes to have common neighbors, is larger in social networks with respect to
the case where links are generated by an independent random process (for Nyakatoke the clustering coefficient
is 0.23, where in an analogous randomly generated network it would be 0.03). For further details on small
world properties see Jackson and Rogers (2007).
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meters and a maximum distance of 1738 meters. The village is relatively poor, with a con-
sumption for adult equivalent unit of less than 2 US $ a week and an average food share in
consumption of 77% (Dercon and De Weerdt, 2006). Households in Nyakatoke get most of
their income from agricultural activities, especially the cultivation of coffee and banana; other
sources of income are rare and off-farming activities are mostly considered supplementary to
farming (Mitti and Rweyemamu, 2001). The village has no primary school (the closest one is
at 2 km) and overall educational level is low, with 26 households out of 119 where no member
has completed primary education. All households nowadays are either Muslim, Lutheran or
Catholic, and the three main formal religious associations play an active role in the social
and economic life of the village. Finally, In Nyakatoke there are 26 different clans, with a
variable number of households from 1 to 23.
A detailed variable description for the empirical analysis will come with Section 6, and
households attributes are described in the Appendix, table 1.A. For additional information
on Nyakatoke I remand to Mitti and Rweyemamu (2001) and De Weerdt (2002).
4 The Theory
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of players connected in some network relationship, where links are
the consequence of agreement between parts. Let the network be denoted by the adjacency
matrix g = [gij ]: for any pair of players {ij} such that i, j ∈ N and i 6= j, gij = 1 indicates
that i and j are linked under the network g, and gij = 0 otherwise. The network matrix is
symmetric, that is, gij = gji. By a standard abuse of notation, let g+ij denote the network g
with the link gij , that is, with gij = 1 and, analogously, g−ij defines the network g without
the link gij , that is, with gij = 0. N(g) is the set of players forming the network g.
In order to identify which networks are likely to arise in various contexts, a notion of
network stability is needed. Let us write ui(g) the utility that agent i derives from network
g. The pairwise stability notion by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) states that the formation of
a link requires the consent of both parties involved, while severance can be done unilaterally;
formally, a network g is pairwise stable if
(i) ∀gij = 1, ui(g+ij) ≥ ui(g−ij) & uj(g+ij) ≥ uj(g−ij) (1)
(ii) ∀gij = 0, ui(g−ij) < ui(g+ij)⇒ uj(g−ij) > uj(g+ij)
That is, a network is pairwise stable if links which are ceteris paribus profitable for both
parties are actually formed, and each player does not benefit in severing any existing link.
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Pairwise stability does not admit multiple or simultaneous deviations. As it frequently ad-
mits large sets of stable allocations, several refinements have been proposed (Jackson and
Van Den Nouweland, 2005; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) however, for the purpose of this
paper the pairwise stability concept will be adopted.
The connection model and the co-author model are two concrete network examples pre-
sented in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In the connection model, links represent social
relationships, which provide benefits but also involve costs. Players incur a cost for every
link they form; on the other hand, they get positive externalities from indirect contacts,
which are for free. Benefits from indirect contacts deteriorate with distance: a friend is more
valuable than a friend of a friend, and so on. In the co-author model, agents are interpreted
as researchers who collaborate in common projects, and network externalities are negative:
the amount of time a researcher can spend on any given project is inversely proportional to
the number of projects he is involved in, so that indirect contacts are detrimental. Jackson
and Wolinsky focus on simplified, symmetric versions of the general setting with homoge-
neous costs and benefits, and show that decentralized decisions do not necessarily lead to an
allocation that maximizes collective utility.
I work with a setting of fully heterogeneous individuals instead: for any pair of agents
{ij} belonging to a community, let the m-dimensional vector Zij define their relative social
characteristics. Let us define tij as the geodesic distance between i and j, that is, the number
of links in the shortest path between then. Geodesic distance is symmetric (tij = tji) and
is set to infinity if there is no path between i and j. The utility that agent i derives from
network g is given by
ui(g) = yi +
∑
j∈N(g)
a(tij) yj +
∑
j:gij=1
βZij (2)
where yi is i’s wealth, a(.) is the weight attached to the wealth of all other agents in the
community as a function of their geodesic distance, and β ∈ Rm are the weights attached
to social characteristics of direct links only. In this simple linear parametrization, which
generalizes the connection model, wealth of indirect contacts generates externalities, which
can be positive or negative in sign. I then proceed to empirics, and propose an estimation
procedure to test for the presence of those externalities.
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5 Estimation Procedure
Using equation (2), for a network configuration g we can write
ui(g+ij)− ui(g−ij) =
∑
k∈N(g+ij)
a(tik)yk −
∑
k∈N(g−ij)
a(tik)yk + βZij (3)
=
n−1∑
φ
∑
k
a(φ)
[
yk∈N(g+ij)
tik=φ
− yk∈N(g−ij)
tik=φ
]
+ βZij (4)
= a(1)yj + a(2)
∑
k
[
yk∈N(g+ij)
tik=2
− yk∈N(g−ij)
tik=2
]
+a(3)
∑
k
[
yk∈N(g+ij)
tik=3
− yk∈N(g−ij)
tik=3
]
+ ...+ βZij (5)
Equation (5) shows how the overall net gain in terms of partners’ discounted wealth can
be decomposed by geodesic distance. Let us set a(φ) = 0 for φ ≥ 4,6 and call
∑
k
[
yk∈N(g+ij)
tik=2
− yk∈N(g−ij)
tik=2
]
≡ two steps gainij
∑
k
[
yk∈N(g+ij)
tik=3
− yk∈N(g−ij)
tik=3
]
≡ three steps gainij
two steps gainij (three steps gainij) expresses the net gain in terms of two (three) steps
away agents’ wealth that i gets if the link gij is formed and the rest of the network is kept
constant. Those quantities can be positive or negative, and can be directly computed on
data.7
To calculate two steps gain and three steps gain I need to define the reference network
g first. Using the outcomes observed in data (i.e. constructing g+ij and g+ij for the obser-
vation {ij} on gkm for all {km} 6= {ij}) is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, it does not
6It needs to be so because in the Nyakatoke data the maximum geodesic distance is 5, which implies that
the regressors accounting for gains from the 1st to the 5th step sum up to zero. Since the network is rather
dense (with an average geodesic distance of 2.5), these readjustments are reabsorbed quickly: five-steps-away
gains equal zero in 13816 out of 14042 observations. Thus gains up to the 4th step are (almost perfectly)
collinear, and I omit four-steps-away gains taking it as a reference category.
7Since the formation of one link changes the entire architecture, the patterns of those quantities are difficult
to predict. For instance, if i sets a link with a j who used to be two steps away, the one-step-away gain of yj
is reflected in a two-steps-away loss, so that two steps gainij is negative if no other two-steps-away gain (i.e.
a third player who used to be further away and is now two-steps-away from i) counterbalances the loss of j.
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address omitted variable endogeneity.8 Second, we fall into the problem of inconsistency of
simultaneous equations with binary variables pointed out by Maddala (1983).9 In order to
overcome both problems at once, I proceed in the following way:
1. I first run a dyadic probit regression to identify which relational characteristics predict
link formation, in a way which is familiar to the risk-sharing literature (De Weerdt
2004, Fachamps and Gubert, 2007b).10 I use it to construct a distribution of possible
networks p̂, where the entry p̂ij is the fitted probability of the link gij = 1 obtained
from the dyadic regression.
2. From the distribution p̂ I draw 20 networks, which I call ĝ1, ..., ĝ20.
3. For each of these generated networks ĝ1, ..., ĝ20 I compute my regressors of interest
two steps gain and three steps gain, which is a matter of advanced matrix manipula-
tion.11
4. The final values of two steps gain and three steps gain included in the regressions are
the average across these 20 values, which hopefully minimizes the sampling variability.
The regressors obtained from this procedure are exogenous but correlated to the observed
network and hence to the true network externalities we want to measure. The interpretation
I have in mind is a setting of imperfect information where individuals share a common belief
about which links are more likely to be formed, however the framework can be adapted to fit
8Omitted variable endogeneity is crucial for inference in network formation: if agents a and b are observa-
tionally equivalent but a has many links while b has none, it may be either because a grants access to many
indirect contacts as I would like to believe, or for some unobserved a’s characteristics.
9Essentially Maddala shows that, if we condition an individual binary outcome on the action undertaken
by another individual in the sample, the likelihood is not valid because it does not sum up to one over all
possible states (network configurations in this case). See also Tamer (2003).
10I run a probit regression over the full sample (14042 dyads), where the binary dependent variable equals
one if a link is declared by any of the two households involved (Section 3). The regressors included are standard
(Fachamps and Gubert, 2007b): sum and absolute difference of land and livestock wealth, distance, dummies
for kinship, same religion, same clan, overlap in productive activities of the two households, and education
(two dummies equal to one if both households have some member who completed primary education or both
households have no member who completed primary education respectively). For a detailed definition of those
variables see Subsection 6.1.
11For any of those generated networks, say ĝ1, I need to: a) generate the network matrices ĝ1+ij and ĝ
1
−ij for
each dyad {ij}, which makes 14042*2 matrices that need to be created; b) generate the associated 14042*2
matrices of geodesic distances using an algorithm similar to the one proposed by Dijkstra (1959); c) combine
those matrices with the vector of individuals’ wealth: for each {ij}, the quantity two steps gainij is computed
as the sum of the wealth of all k ∈ N(ĝ1+ij) such that tik = 2 minus the sum of the wealth of all k ∈ N(ĝ1−ij)
such that tik = 2. Similarly, two steps gainji is computed as the sum of the wealth of all k ∈ N(ĝ1+ij) such
that tjk = 2 minus the sum of the wealth of all k ∈ N(ĝ1−ij) such that tjk = 2.
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different stories.12
Let us define a response variable wij which represents i’s willingness to form the link gij
wij =
{
1 if ui(g+ij)− ui(g−ij) + ij ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(6)
where ij is a zero-mean residual. Analogously, wji represents j’s willingness to form the
link gij
wji =
{
1 if uj(g+ij)− uj(g−ij) + ji ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(7)
Under pairwise stability (Equation 1), link formation reduces to
P (gij = 1) = P (wij = 1 & wji = 1) (8)
P (gij = 0) = 1− P (wij = 1 & wji = 1)
This two-equation system is estimated as a bivariate probit with partial observability
a` la Poirier (1980) (see also Maddala, 1983; Abowd and Farber, 1982; Farber, 1983). In
the standard bivariate probit, a joint distribution of the errors [ij , ji] ∼ bivariate normal
[0, 0, 1, 1, ρ] is assumed. Partial observability occurs when we can observe a positive outcome
for one response variable only if the other response variable is also positive. In other words,
we do not fully observe wij , wji but when gij = 1 we know that wij = wji = 1. Viceversa,
when gij = 0 we cannot distinguish between the following three cases: wij = 0 & wji = 1;
wij = 1 & wji = 0; wij = wji = 0. Provided that the system in properly identified, evalu-
ating the associated likelihood function we can estimate the two equations and recover the
determinants of wij and wji separately.
Therefore, using Equation (5) for each {ij} I estimate the two equations
12For instance, we can imagine agents sophisticated enough to compute from p̂ the exact probability of all
network configurations, which makes the construction of two steps gain and three steps gain computationally
more demanding but avoids the multiple networks draws. On another line, we can assign agent-specific
beliefs, which may be useful to investigate issues related to equilibrium refinement. Also, instead of using
two steps gain and three steps gain as exogenous regressors, we could use them as instrumental variables in a
traditional two-stage strategy (results with bootstrapped standard errors are similar to the ones in Subsection
6.2.).
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wij =
{
1 if a(1)yj + a(2) two steps gainij + a(3) three steps gainij + βZij + ij ≥ 0
0 otherwise
wji =
{
1 if a(1)yi + a(2) two steps gainji + a(3) three steps gainji + βZji + ji ≥ 0
0 otherwise
where the estimated coefficients a and β are the same by construction across the two
equations because of the data symmetry (i.e. both dyads {ij} and {ji} are included). This
provides a straightforward test of my hypothesis: if the coefficients a(2), a(3) turn out sig-
nificant this suggests that when agents form arrangements they also consider the relative
position and the wealth of indirect contacts.
One last issue to be solved is the correlation of residuals among observations. As the
sampled individuals are the same across dyads, the dyadic observations are by construction
non-independent, which invalidates the standard errors. I specify a clustered covariance ma-
trix as the one in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a), which corrects for arbitrary correlation
across all observations involving either i or j: the only structure imposed on the covariance
is that E[ij , ik] 6= 0, E[ij , kj ] 6= 0, E[ij , jk] 6= 0 and E[ij , ki] 6= 0 for all k but that
E[ij , km] = 0 otherwise. This formula also corrects for heteroskedasticity and for the dou-
ble counting of the dyads {ij} and {ji}.
6 Specifications and Results
6.1 Variable Definition
For each dyadic observation {ij} we separately estimate two binary equations, whose de-
pendent variables wij and wji are partially observed through gij (defined in Section 3). We
report the estimated results for wij , that is, the willingness of i to form the link gij . Results
for wji are identical because of the data symmetry, and therefore are not reported.
The willingness to form a link wij is assumed to depend on the wealth of j and of indirect
contacts, and on the social characteristics of i and j. In particular:
wealthj is given by the total monetary value of j’s land and livestock assets, while wealth
gains from indirect contacts two steps gainij and three steps gainij are computed as ex-
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plained in Section 5. The unit of measure are Tanzanian Shillings (1 unit=100000 tzs).13
Most wealth is inherited through strict patrilineal rules and passed down the clan (custom-
ary land tenure laws used to prohibit the selling of land – see Mitti and Rweyamamu, 2001),
which should reasonably rule out inverse causality between wealth and links. Still, part of
the estimated effect in Section 6.2 may be seen as correlation rather than causation, and
unfortunately no existing data would address the issue.
To proxy for the desire to link with similar households (homophyly),14 I include the follow-
ing relational dummies: same clan and same religion (which equal one if the two households
belong to the same clan or profess the same religion respectively), neighbours (which equals
one if the two households’ houses are less than 300 meters apart), kinship (which equals one
if a member of one household has a strict blood bond –child, parents, siblings– with a mem-
ber of the other household) and same education (which equals one if both households are
educated or both are non-educated, considering a household educated if at least one member
has completed primary school).
To proxy for i’s attitude and desire to link I include two religious dummies which equal
one if household i is Lutheran or Catholic respectively (where Muslim is the omitted cat-
egory), and the shares of households i’s total labor devoted to cropping, casual labor and
trade, which are the three most common income generating activities in Nyakatoke.15 These
latter variables are meant to control for the nature of i’s income, as some activities guarantee
a more stable income against non-idiosyncratic shocks.
In Nyakatoke mutual support links between wealthy and poor households are very fre-
quent.16 This suggests that wealthy households may have non-economic motivations to form
13Data on land were originally in acres, and were transformed in monetary equivalent with a conversion
rate of 300000 tzs for 1 acre, which reflects average local prices in 2000. For international comparisons, the
exchange rate in 2000 was 1 US dollar for 800 tzs.
14Social proximity between partners decreases enforcement and monitoring costs of links. Studying micro-
finance group-lending programs in the Andes Karlan (2007) concludes that more homogeneous groups have
higher repayment rates due to their higher social capital and ease of monitoring.
15In the survey each adult mentions the productive activities he is involved in (coded in seven categories:
casual labor, trade, crops, livestock rearing, assets, processing of agricultural products and other off-farm
work). Since individuals do not mention the relative importance of each activity, all mentioned activities are
assumed to contribute in the same measure. Therefore, for each household the share of total time devoted to
cropping is calculated on the base of the number of active adult members and their activities.
16At first we could think that those links are always declared by the poorer partner, but this is not the
case: when the link is declared by one side only, it is the wealthier partner in 42% of cases. Moreover, in the
survey individuals could list as many contacts as they want and, since on average wealthy people also have
more links (Table 5.A), they are likely to quote only the most important ones.
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links, like altruism or symbolic attributes such as social esteem an political power.17 To cap-
ture these effects, we include among the regressors the absolute value of the partners’ wealth
difference difference wealth and a dummy more wealthi which equals one if household i is
wealthier that j.
Descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix, figure 2.A and tables 2.A to 3.A.
6.2 Results
Table 2 reports the results for the wij equation under three different specifications: column
(1) refers to the benchmark case where only direct partners’ wealth is taken into account for
link formation. In columns (2) and (3) I include the net wealth gains from indirect contacts
two and three steps away respectively. The corresponding marginal effects are reported in
the Appendix, Table 4.A.
wealthj is positive and significant across all specifications: as expected, the wealthier a
potential partner, the more desirable a link with him. two steps gainij , which represent the
net wealth gain in term of two steps away partners if the link is formed, is significant and
negative in sign. This negative externality seems to suggest a competition mechanism over
scarce resources. On the other hand, three steps gainij is not significant, suggesting that
agents do not take into account the network configuration further than two steps away from
them, perhaps because it would require too much information to do so. The absolute mag-
nitude of direct and indirect effects is decreasing in the geodesic distance, as theory predicts.
Subsection 6.3 elaborates on the interpretation of those results.
All other variables have the expected sign, and reconfirm what has been documented by
previous studies on informal insurance arrangements (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt,
2004; Dekker, 2004). Geographical proximity between two households significantly correlates
with the existence of a link, and the same holds for kinship ties which is the variable with
the highest impact. Clan belonging is marginally significant in specifications (2) and (3),
with a positive sign. Education and i’s attitude (religious belonging and income generating
activities) do not seem significant. While i’s religion is not significant, a common religion has
a marginally significant impact on the willingness to form a link in specifications (2) and (3).
more wealthi and difference wealth are not significant, reconfirming that rich individuals
are not reluctant to form links with the villagers who have less.
17Several economists have indeed interpreted gift transactions as exchange rather than altruism, and have
recognized asymmetric exchanges as the base of village-level patronage relationships in developing countries
(Breman, 1974; Scott, 1976; Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 1995).
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Table 2: Results
dependent variable: wij
(1) (2) (3)
wealthj 0.057** 0.067*** 0.071***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.018)
two steps gainsij -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003)
three steps gainsij 0.004
(0.004)
neighbours 0.472* 0.539*** 0.549***
(0.275) (0.078) (0.095)
same clan 0.186 0.202* 0.198*
(0.141) (0.106) (0.110)
Lutherani 0.061 -0.058 -0.046
(0.122) (0.117) (0.133)
Catholici -0.013 -0.108 -0.103
(0.111) (0.105) (0.115)
same religion 0.149 0.173** 0.172**
(0.096) (0.067) (0.070)
kinship 1.450*** 1.307*** 1.311***
(0.428) (0.132) (0.137)
same education -0.007 0.004 0.009
(0.040) (0.058) (0.059)
labour share croppingi -0.089 -0.200 -0.199
(0.122) (0.138) (0.150)
labour share casuali -0.172 -0.037 -0.084
(0.203) (0.214) (0.267)
labour share tradei -0.299 -0.152 -0.177
(0.327) (0.219) (0.266)
difference wealth -0.026 0.004 0.003
(0.023) (0.009) (0.009)
more wealthi 3.211 -0.886 -0.549
(2.532) (0.644) (1.171)
constant -1.751** -0.510 -0.809
(0.681) (0.691) (1.247)
arctan(rho) -1.004 0.534 0.749
(1.334) (0.616) (1.269)
N 14042 14042 14042
Note: dyadic-corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
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The list of regressors in Table 2 is conservative because the dataset is rather small, and
because partial observability models are very demanding from the estimation perspective,
and well known for their convergence difficulties. Switching to a stepping algorithm for non-
concave regions of the likelihood function alleviates part of the problem, but with certain
large or non-differentiated sets of regressors convergence may not be achieved. However, the
example is meant to be illustrative of the methodology proposed, and all the major findings
are robust to alternative specifications, including the elimination of wealth outliers.
6.3 Discussion and Extensions
As network theory acknowledges from its very first steps (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), link
formation may generate positive or negative externalities: indirect contacts are beneficial if
they broaden social interactions, but they are detrimental if there is competition for scarce
(social and/or economic) resources. Mutual support arrangements are an intriguing example
combining positive and negative indirect externalities, and without doubt is the most impor-
tant example in the context of rural developing countries. The estimates of a(2) in Table 2
suggest that the villagers of Nyakatoke prefer rich partners, but with fewer and/or poorer
contacts. Since the distribution of wealth is relatively egalitarian, with a Gini coefficient
of 0.43 (Figure 2.A), it comes natural to interpret this result as a condition on the number
(rather than on the wealth) of indirect contacts: a desiderable partner is wealthy, and has
few additional friends. This interpretation, which stresses the scarcity of economic resources,
is in line with the fact that most households in Nyakatoke live at the subsistence level (with
an average food share on consumption of 77%), and that most benefits that can be extracted
from partners are exclusive by their own nature, as anecdotal evidence reports.18 However,
the result can also be seen as a condition on the wealth of indirect contacts: holding the
number of indirect contacts fixed while increasing their wealth, two steps gains increases
and thus the willigness to form a link decreases. This cannot be seen as a pure economic
motivation, as rich indirect contacts cannot be detrimental if we interpret mutual support
links as access to insurance. However it may be intepreted as a motivation related to social
norms, as patron-client relations and social esteem are strong determinants of transfers in
agrarian societies (Platteau, 1995 and 1996).
It should be pointed out that agents do not need to be aware of the full network archi-
tecture in order for indirect contacts to matter as previously shown. For instance, it may be
18Mitti and Rweyamamu (2001) report that “free gift of land for cultivation of seasonal crops among friends
and neighbours is quite common. A little of the produce may be given to the landowner as a gesture of
appreciation for the use of his land” and “some villagers (especially women) perform vigodi [a term used in
the locality to mean casual labor] or working on other households farms for cash”.
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simply the case that partners with few additional contacts tend to be of a greater help in
case of need, and that survey respondents internalize this. What these results show, which
is innovative, is that the networks architecture has an explanatory value that we disregard
if we only focus on a reduced-form estimation of direct characteristics. Previous papers on
link formation have taken the dyad as unit of analysis to focus on relational variables only
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007a; De Weerdt, 2004; Dekker, 2004). This paper is the first
attempt to overcome the dyadic approach and disentangle the link formation process into
two separate components modeling the decisions of the agents involved. This allows me to
include individual-specific regressors and, among them, the proxies for the indirect gains
two steps gain and three steps gain, which should be interpreted as revealed preferences
over partners’ network position (“ceteris paribus, I prefer friends who have few/poor other
friends”).
As a final note, in the current specification I only allow externalities from indirect contacts
in the dimension of wealth. However, my method can be extended to estimate a generalized
payoff function of the type
ui(g) = yi +
∑
j∈N(g)
[a(tij) yj + β(tij)Zij ] (9)
which would show which social characteristics have positive externalities, and whether
the negative externalities for wealth are outweighed by positive social externalities.
7 Conclusions
This paper performs a structural estimation of a model of endogenous network formation. I
approach mutual support arrangements from a network perspective, investigating how links
are formed and whether indirect contacts generate externalities: I test the hypothesis that
agents also consider the wealth of indirect contacts when they decide to form a link. A proto-
col to estimate network formation models a` la Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is proposed and
applied to data on the Tanzanian village of Nyakatoke. Results show that indirect contacts
matter, that is, that agents forming links take into account the structure of the community
network. Network externalities from indirect contacts’ wealth are shown to be negative, which
suggests a mechanism of competition over scarce economic or social resources. This paper
contributes to both applied network economics and the literature on informal arrangements
in that it proposes an innovative procedure to estimate endogenous network formation mod-
els, and also provides evidence that indirect contacts have an explanatory value disregarded
by all previous studies, which are focused on direct relations only.
17
References
Abowd, J.M and H.S. Farber (1982): “Job Queues and the Union Status of Workers”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 35, 3, 354-367.
Arcand, J.-L. and M. Fafchamps (2008): “Matching in Community-Based Organizations”,
(mimeograph).
Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000): “A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation”, Econo-
metrica, 68, 5, 181-1229.
Bloch, F., G. Genicot and D. Ray (2008): “Informal Insurance in Social Networks”, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 143(1), 36-58.
Bogugna’, M., R. Pastor-Satorras , A. Diaz-Guilera and A. Arenas (2004): “Models of
Social Networks based on Social Distance Attachment”, Physical Review 70.
Bramoulle´, Y. and R. Kranton (2007): “Risk Sharing Networks”, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 64(3-4), 275-294.
Breman, J. (1974): “Patronage and Exploitation-Changing Agrarian Relations in South
Gujarat”, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Calvo´-Armengol, A., E. Patacchini and Y. Zenou (2009): “Peer Effects and Social Net-
works in Education”, Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1239-1267.
Coate, S. and M. Ravallion (1993): “Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization
and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements”, Journal of Development Economics,
40, 1-24.
Comola, M and M. Fafchamps (2009): “Testing Unilateral versus Bilateral Link Forma-
tion”, Paris School of Economics WP 2009-30.
Conley, T. and G. Topa (2002): “Socio-Economic Distance and Spatial Patterns in Un-
employment”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 17, 303-327.
Conley, T. and C. Udry (2005): “Learning about a new technology: pineapple in Ghana”,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Proceedings.
18
Coleman, J.S. (1988): “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, American
Journal of Sociology, 94, S95-S120.
Dasgupta, P. (2003): “Social Capital and Economic Performance: Analytics” published
in Foundations of Social Capital, E. Ostrom and T.K. Ahn, eds (Cheltenham UK: Edward
Elgar).
Dekker, M. (2004): “Risk sharing in rural Zimbabwe: An empirical Analysis of Endoge-
nous Network Formation”, mimeograph.
Dercon, S. and J. De Weerdt (2006): “Risk Sharing Networks and Insurance against Ill-
ness”, Journal of Development Economics, 81, 2, 337-356.
De Weerdt, J. (2002): “Community Organizations in Rural Tanzania: A Case Study of
the Community of Nyakatoke, Buboka Rural District”, Economic Development Initiatives
mimeograph.
De Weerdt, J. (2004): “Risk Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation”, Insurance
Against Poverty, Oxford University Press, chapter 10.
Dijkstra, E.D (1959): “A note on two problems in connexion with graphs”, Numerische
Mathematik 1, 269-271.
Fafchamps, M. (1992): “Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants
with a Moral Economy” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41 (1), 147-174.
Fafchamps, M. (2003): “Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade”, Contributions to Eco-
nomic Analysis & Policy : Vol. 2: No. 1, Article 14.
Fafchamps, M. and F. Gubert (2007a): “Risk-Sharing and Network Formation” American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97, 75-79.
Fafchamps, M. and F. Gubert (2007b): “The Formation of Risk Sharing Networks” Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 83(2):326.50.
Fafchamps, M. and S. Lund (2003): “Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines” Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 71,2, 261-287 (27).
19
Farber, H.S. (1983): “The Determination of Union Status of Workers”, Econometrica, 51
(5), 1417-1438.
Galeotti, A., S. Goyal and J. Kamphorst (2006): “Network Formation with Heterogeneous
Players”, Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 353-372.
Genicot, G. and D. Ray (2003): “Group Formation in Risk Sharing Arrangements”, Re-
view of Economic Studies 70, 87-113.
Goldstein, M., De Janvry, A. and E. Sadoulet (2002): “Is a Friend in Need a Friend In-
deed? Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana”, STICERD
Working Paper DEDPS 32.
Grimard, F. (1997): “Households Consumption Smoothing through Ethnic Ties: Evi-
dence form Core D’Ivoire” Journal of Development Economics, 53, 391-422.
Guimera’, R., L. Danon, A. Diaz-Guilera, F. Giralt, and A. Arenas (2003): “Self-similar
Community Structure in a Network of Human Interactions”, Physical Review 68.
Hoddinott, J., S. Dercon and P. Krishnan (2005): “Networks and Informal Mutual Sup-
port in 15 Ethiopian Villages”, Mimeograph.
Jackson, M. (2004): “A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency”,
in Group Formation in Economics; Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Cambridge University
Press.
Jackson, M. (2006): “The Economics of Social Networks”, in Advances in Economics and
Econometrics, Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society,
Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, M. and B. Rogers (2007): “Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Ran-
dom are Social Networks?” American Economic Review, 97(3), 890-915.
Jackson, M. and A. Van Den Nouweland (2005): “Strongly Stable Networks”, Games and
Economic Behavior, 51 (2), 420-444.
Jackson, M and A. Wolinsky (1996): “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Net-
20
works”, Journal of Economic Theory, 71,44-74.
Karlan, D. S. (2007): “Social Connections and Group Banking”, Economic Journal,
117(517), F52-F84.
Krishnan, P. and E. Sciubba (2009): “Links and Architecture in Village Networks”, Eco-
nomic Journal, 119(537), 917-949.
Ligon, E. (1998): “Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 65, 847-864.
Ligon, E., J.P Thomas and T. Worrall (2000): “Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings
and Limited Commitment”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 3, 216-246.
Mace, B.J. (1991): “Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty”, Journal
of Political Economy, 99(5), 928-956.
Maddala, G.S. (1983): “Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics”,
Cambridge University Press.
Mitti R. and T. Rweyemamu (2001): “A Socio-Economic Profile of Nyakatoke”, Mimeo-
graph.
Poirer, D.J. (1980): “Partial Observability in Bivariate Probit Models” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 12, 209-217.
Platteau, J.P. (1995): “An Indian Model of Aristocratic Patronage”, Oxford Economic
Papers 47 (4), 636-662.
Platteau, J.-P. (1996): “Traditional Sharing Norms as an Obstacle to Economic Growth
in Tribal Societies”, Technical report, CRED, FacultE`s Universitaires Note-Dame de la Paix,
Namur, Belgium. Cahiers No. 173.
Ravallion, M. and Chaudhuri, S. (1997): “Risk and Insurance in Village India: Com-
ment”, Econometrica, 65(1), 171-184.
Rosenzweig, M.R. (1988): “Risk, Implicit Contract and the Family in Rural Areas of
Low-income Countries” Economic Journal, 98, 393, 1148-1170.
21
Scott, J. (1976): “The Moral Economy of the Peasant”, Yale University Press, New Haven,
CT.
Tamer, E. (2003): “Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple
Equilibria”, Review of Economic Studies, 70, 147-167.
Udry, C. (1994): “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: an Empirical Investiga-
tion in Northern Nigeria”, Review of Economic Studies, 61, 495-526.
Vega-Redondo, F. (2007): “Complex Social Networks”, Econometric Society Monographs,
Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, W.J. (1987): “The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy”, University of Chicago Press.
22
Appendix
Figure 1.A: Links among Nyakatoke Households
Figure 2.A: Wealth Quantiles
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Table 1.A: Households’ Attributes
religion Muslim 24 n=119
Lutheran 46
Catholic 49
education At least one mem-
ber with primary
school
93 n=119
No member with
primary school
26
clan composition 1 household 11 n=119
2 households 5
3 households 2
4 to 10 households 5
12 to 23 house-
holds
3
at least one member casual labor 57 n=116
engaged in trade 45
crops 108
livestock 31
assets 8
processing 41
other off-farm 40
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Table 2.A: Distribution of Dichotomous Variables
Variable Value Dyads (n=14042)
link gij 1 980
0 13062
kinship 1 218
0 13824
same clan 1 1318
0 12724
same religion 1 4974
0 9068
neighbors 1 3462
0 10580
same education 1 9074
0 4968
Table 3.A: Distribution of Continuous Variables
variable mean min max s.d.
wealthj 4.55 0 27.97 4.82
two steps gainsij 16.91 -30.92 125.90 10.91
three steps gainsij -13.86 -76.66 97.06 13.23
labour share croppingi 0.39 0 1 0.26
labour share casuali 0.19 0 1 0.24
labour share tradei 0.11 0 1 0.20
difference wealth 4.40 0 27.97 5.24
Note: values computed on the full sample of 14042 dyads.
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Table 4.A: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
wealthj 0.0142 0.0050 0.0047
two steps gainsij -0.0017 -0.0014
three steps gainsij 0.0003
neighbours 0.1231 0.0404 0.0354
same clan 0.0483 0.0152 0.0130
Lutherani 0.0152 -0.0043 -0.0030
Catholici -0.0033 -0.0080 -0.0067
same religion 0.0376 0.0129 0.0113
kinship 0.3273 0.0844 0.0652
same education -0.0018 0.0003 0.0006
labour share croppingi -0.0221 -0.0148 -0.0130
labour share casuali -0.0429 -0.0027 -0.0055
labour share tradei -0.0747 -0.0113 -0.0116
difference wealth -0.0064 0.0003 0.0002
more wealthi 0.5053 -0.0632 -0.0352
Table 5.A: Links by Wealth Quintile
quintile mean wealth average number
of links
quintile 1 0.91 5.17
quintile 2 1.90 7.67
quintile 3 3.07 8.92
quintile 4 4.66 8.08
quintile 5 12.43 11.30
centile 90 16.82 12.55
centile 95 20.24 16.00
Note: 1 unit of wealth corresponds to 100000 tzs.
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